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Book Review

Too Pragmatic by Half
Richard A. Epsteint
Eco-Pragmatism: Making Sensible Environmental Decisions in an
Uncertain World. By Daniel A. Farber.* Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1999. Pp. 210. $23.00.
I. AN ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE?

The environment has always been with us; but environmental law, as a
unified and self-contained discipline, is a social construction-perhaps the
social construction-of the last thirty years. The field, qua field, received its
first visible external boost with Earth Day in 1972, two years after Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act.' More than any other event,
that Act transformed the ambition, structure, and scope of environmental
law. Haphazard reliance on common-law remedies, specialized statutes, and
sleepy administrative oversight were replaced by a new, comprehensive set
of legislative initiatives. From their incubation in the early 1970s,
environmental protection programs have proliferated at the national, state,
and local levels, and today virtually every proposed use of land, water, or
air runs headlong into one or more complex environmental statutes or
regulations.
In the abstract, it is hard to say whether this environmentalism is
a good or a bad thing. The nub of the difficulty is that the term

'I James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I should
like to thank Jonathan Mitchell for his characteristically indefatigable research assistance.
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4370d (1994). For a discussion of the passage of the NEPA, see William
L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Promise: The Role of Erecutive Oversight in the
Implementation of EnvironmentalPolicy, 64 IND. L.J. 205 (1989).
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"environmentalism" has no traction until it is placed in opposition to some
other movement or world view. By parity of reasoning, unless it is viewed
as an epithet, the term "antienvironmentalist" also has no particular
content. So-called antienvironmentalists generally oppose pollution, just as
the National Rifle Association is on record against gun violence. But with
environmental (and gun) regulation, the real battle is over two familiar
questions. First, what counts as the proper mix of government and private
remedies: private damage actions, class actions, injunctions, fines,
inspections, and the like? Second, who should have the power to address
environmental issues: Congress, the EPA, state agencies? Should other
parties be added to the mix, such as nongovernmental organizations, private
conservation groups, and ordinary businesses that find it useful to adopt a
pro-environmental stance?
These sprawling and complex topics cannot be resolved by a set of ad
hoc political compromises, nor can the central principles of an
environmental program be successfully encapsulated in a few stale slogans.
The fate of the nation-and, one is often reminded, that of the worlddeserves a more systematic and hard-headed examination. Yet too often
environmental issues evoke inconsistent forms of quasi-religious fervor. On
one side stand those individuals and groups who insist, with Vice President
Al Gore, 2 that stringent environmental measures such as the Kyoto accords'
are needed to save the planet from destruction by its most notorious species.
On the other side, many commentators with equal intensity bemoan the
bloated, officious, and heavy-handed bureaucracy that comes in the wake of
high-minded environmental regulation.
This contentious battlefield seems to cry out for some comprehensive
and detached overview. One recent effort is Daniel Farber's book EcoPragmatism,4 which carries with it the ponderous, if soothing, subtitle
Making Sensible EnvironmentalDecisions in an Uncertain World. This title
sets out Farber's overall take on environmental issues. He places himself
squarely in the environmentalist camp, but tries at every stage to distance
himself from what he perceives, rightly, as the mindless fervor of some of
the movement's zealots. The word "pragmatism" in his title conveys his
two joint commitments: unflagging support for the environmental cause and
2. See AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992). For an

acerbic but fully justified response by that inveterate optimist, the late Julian Simon, see JULIAN
SIMON, HOODWINKING THE NATION 87-90 (1999), which skewers Gore's claims about the
increased rate of farmland erosion, the harmful effects of DDT, and the ostensible damage to
humans at Love Canal.
3. Descriptions of the Kyoto accords are found in Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998);
and Paul G. Harris, Common but DifferentiatedResponsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and United
States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 27 (1999).
4. DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
INAN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999).
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allegiance to the institutional and political safeguards needed to curb the
excesses of the environmental movement. Farber's "sensible" pragmatism
always seeks refuge in some safe middle ground; it is animated by his keen
awareness of the massive uncertainty that plagues all large-scale
environmental decisions. His program searches diligently for the right mix
of abstract principle and practical wisdom. Farber's pragmatism cuts an
uncertain path between two extremes. In one breath, he recoils from "ad
hoc decision making [and] raw intuition." 5 In the next, he derides the use of
"mechanical technique to give cut-and-dried answers to hard policy
questions." 6 Commendably, Farber sees no shortcuts; a successful
environmental policy requires one to marry shrewd political judgments to
solid empirical work.
To deliver on this avowedly middle-of-the-road observation, Farber
cautions us repeatedly on the limitations of stripped-down economic costbenefit analysis in guiding our social decisions. In line with fashionable
neo-republican sentiments, he constantly exhorts us to go beyond costbenefit analysis by taking into account the political sensibilities generated
through democratic institutions: Dialogue and deliberation not only record
and tally individual preferences, but they also shape and enrich them.
Farber claims that a national consensus backs his overall position, and, too
quickly for my taste, he invokes the republican "we" by opening his book
with the portentous statement, "We have made a profound national
commitment to environmental protection." 7 He then backs this claim by
noting that Republicans and Democrats alike embrace the environmental
agenda: In 1988 George Bush ran, and won, in part as the "environmental
president."' Seven years later, he reports, the Republicans learned to their
sorrow that neither party can afford to abandon an environmentalist image.
For Farber, the difficult task is how to cash out this national
commitment in a pragmatic way. With evident pride, Farber is an "on-theone-hand, on-the-other-hand" kind of guy. He champions an
"environmental baseline" for testing all forms of private and governmental
behavior, but in the next breath, he seeks to avoid excessive expenditures
that produce only marginal environmental benefit. The sentence that best
captures both his conciliatory tone and his wobbly thesis reads: "To the
extent feasible without incurring costs grossly disproportionate to any
benefit, the government should eliminate significant environmental risks." 9
It is within the context of this thesis that his environmental baseline takes
5. Id.at 10.
6. J&
7. Id.at 1.
8. 1d. at 2-3; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels. Dir)' Air. in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19, 21 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L Smith. Jr. eds.,
1992) (discussing the political aspects of environmentalism).
9. FARBER, supra note4, at 131.
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hold. Like other baselines, Farber's sets the default position in the event
that the evidence is uncertain. As with other presumptions, that baseline
controls unless and until it is displaced by further evidence that suggests
that some other interest should be paramount (or at least respected) in any
given case. Given his baseline, ties go to the environmentalists, both for
statutory construction and for factual disputes.
At one level it is hard to dispute so reasonable a thesis, stated at such a
high level of abstraction. But there is much to be troubled by in his soothing
proposition. At a theoretical level, pragmatism is hardly an uncontested
philosophy. Its lack of coherence and structure frustrates the articulation of
any set of principles-such as those based on justice or utility-to guide
our basic inquiry. This want of structure permits Farber to overestimate the
social consensus behind his own preferred outcomes, so that he never
articulates or responds to views that are foreign to his environmental
parade. For those of us schooled in the laissez-faire tradition, it is easy to
envision yet another presumption: Government intervention is an evil
unless and until it can be shown to be a good.'" That presumption is often
more easily rebutted in environmental cases than in other contexts, but it
still sets the default position 180 degrees opposite Farber. Yet Farber never
so much as addresses the relative strengths of that alternative baseline (or
the case for having no baseline at all). Nor does he examine any of the
arguments of writers who see in the self-professed environmental
movement an arrogance that results in the trampling of individual liberty
and ordinary communities without advancing any legitimate environmental
ends. Strong feelings run in both directions, yet Farber imagines a tranquil
environmentalist consensus that keeps him aloof from today's contentious
struggles.
Within the compass of a single review, it is difficult to develop an
alternative environmental framework that addresses both the conceptual and
political issues. But I do hope to demonstrate why Farber's approach should
be rejected. I see no reason for any special baseline for environmental
interests, any more than I accept a "labor" baseline that favors workers
over employers, a "health" baseline that favors patients over physicians
and managed care organizations, or an "agricultural" baseline that favors

10. For an expression of this attitude, see, for example, Aaron Director, The Parity of the
Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1964): "Laissez faire has never been more than a
slogan in defense of the proposition that every extension of state activity should be examined
under a presumption of error." In truth, I think that this formulation understates the connection of
laissez faire with substantive commitments to private property and freedom of contract, for it is
those principles that erect the presumption of which Director speaks. They do so because it is
thought that these principles will serve the public better than any alternative conception of the
proper role of government. Thus, a normative approach that emphasizes these substantive
commitments would look with skepticism on existing programs that were in conflict with these

substantive commitments.
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farmers over industrialists. Quite the opposite: I am deeply suspicious of
any and all forms of special pleading that claim exemption from the general
rules of property, contract, and tort. In taking this position, I do not wish to
claim that no government intervention (including intervention supported by
taxes) is appropriate. Rather, I take a position that comes closer to that
associated with the traditional accounts of laissez faire, that government
intervention (being costly) is an evil until it is shown to be a good. But that
proposition in turn yields to one that treats it as a proper function of
government to protect the common-law property rights of ordinary
individuals. Under this proposition, the government also should provide
some mechanism to deal with common-pool assets that are neither owned
by any individual nor, under many circumstances (as with the open seas),
subject to reduction to private ownership at all."
I believe that this standard common-law approach to property rights,
which draws heavily on economic literature, is more likely to achieve the
results that Farber desires for environmental reasons than the shapeless
environmental baseline he champions. The basic position here is that the
modem environmental movement has fundamentally misperceived the
source of environmental difficulty. Rather than denigrating the commonlaw system of rights and duties, it ought to build upon them in order to
remedy the weaknesses that arise in any system that relies on individual
remedies to enforce property rights.
On this view, the basic set of rights and wrongs stems from the
common law of nuisance, with its initial emphasis on the physical invasion
of the property of one person by discharges from the land of another. It
hardly matters for these purposes that early pollution cases may have
involved sewage while modem cases may involve nuclear waste. In each
case we should focus on stopping the harms by one person to another. This
system will break down, to be sure, when the pollution in question is of
public waters, but once again novelty is not the source of difficulty. In both
early and modem times, the key task has been to devise mechanisms for the
regulation of the commons, ones that allow the state to sue for the pollution
of private property as though it were the owner of the resources that were
harmed by the pollution in question. Now that we are richer as a nation than
we were in earlier times, we should expect the overall tolerance for
environmental harms to diminish. But that systematic change in
expectations does not cash itself out upon the adoption of some brand-new
paradigm complete with its own baseline. It has never been possible to stop
all pollution; with increasing wealth, the appropriate social response is to
11. For a version of this account of laissez faire, see Jacob Viner. 77Te Intellectual History of
Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & EcON. 45 (1960). For a fuller account. see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN.
PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON

GOOD (1998).
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reduce our common expectations of the acceptable level of background
pollution.
No environmental policy, however, is complete with the use of legal
sticks alone. Legal carrots are important as well. The effort to obtain higher
environmental standards does not stop with the prevention of pollution. It
may also involve setting aside a larger fraction of social resources for
environmental use. But it hardly follows that we should not have to pay for
the resources that we as a nation take. Although Farber spends virtually no
time explaining when regulation ends and the duty to compensate begins,
that question is critical to the overall operation of any sound environmental
system. And on that vexed issue, once again the older understandings
should be preferred to the newer ones. When the government restricts
private use of land to serve environmental objectives, compensation is
appropriate unless the government can bring itself within the traditional
justifications for the operation of its police power.
The major program of this Review, therefore, is to contrast two
approaches to environmentalism: an approach that sees no legal novelty in
environmental issues and that uses traditional techniques to address them,
and Farber's approach, which sees his distinctive pragmatism, with its
environmental baseline, as the key to success in any modern vision of
environmentalism. In pursuing this program, I shall follow the course that
Farber sets. In Part II, I examine the case that Farber treats as the leitmotif
for his book, the protracted struggle in United States v. Reserve Mining
Co. 12 At bottom, our approaches to this case are remarkably similar, so my
major purpose is to explain why the property baselines of the common law
give a better theoretical explanation of the problem than does Farber's
revised baseline. Thereafter I turn to issues on which the two approaches
tend to diverge in both outcome and approach. Part III expands the
discussion to cover other forms of common-pool assets, most notably those
pertaining to fisheries and air quality. In it I argue that the traditional
principles of private nuisance law carry over to unowned assets, so long as
the state is in the position to act as the protector of these assets as if it were
their private owner. Part IV addresses the question of whether-and if so,
how-to discount environmental losses to future generations. In it I argue
that it is a mistake to plan for the indefinite future, and far wiser to make
sure that we place our own children in a position to carry out as best they
can a sensible regime of environmental protection. Part V explores the role
of just compensation for individuals or groups that are adversely affected
by environmental issues. In it I argue that the compensation requirement,

12. 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc). My summary of the facts closely follows Farber's excellent account
in Chapter 1, fittingly described as "A Case of Uncertainty."
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rightly applied, serves both political and instrumental ends. By forcing the
government to respond to price information, the compensation requirement
can limit the amount of political adventurism in environmental regulation
and facilitate the responsible trade-off between environmental and
nonenvironmental goals.
II. LEARNING FROM ONE CASE

Reserve Mining arose out of the government's effort to stop the massive
discharge of tailings (twenty-five million tons per year) into Lake
Superior-a practice that the Reserve Mining Company had engaged in for
a number of years. These tailings were the wasteful by-product from mining
and purifying taconite, a low-grade iron ore found in extensive
concentrations near Duluth, Minnesota, on the north shore of Lake
Superior. When Reserve built its plant in the mid-1950s, the enterprise was
greeted warmly by its neighbors as the economic savior of a depressed
community. But as the years wore on, the evident environmental spillovers
led to governmental efforts to abate the company's discharges into public
waters. The discharges created a plume of "green water" "3that extended
for a distance of eighteen miles. The concentrations of iron, lead, and
copper were above state-allowed levels, and those for zinc and cadmium
were above state-recommended levels. Notwithstanding the aesthetic
harms, no one could pinpoint any ecological damage caused by these
discharges, nor could anyone predict with confidence whether harms to
health and safety might materialize in the future. The mining operations
presented familiar risks with which the local citizenry had grown
comfortable, perhaps too comfortable, over time. The government's case,
however, was transformed just before going to trial in 1973, when asbestos
was found in the drinking water in Duluth. That dramatic disclosure raised
serious public health concerns. By 1973 everyone knew that airborne
asbestos posed major health risks, but it was at best unclear whether
asbestos was harmful if swallowed. The district court's task was to resolve
the uncertainties.
The high stakes at the trial were further raised because Judge Miles
Lord (known as "Miles the Lord" )4 presided over the proceedings. Lord
had strong conceptions of right and wrong and would not, it was said, let
anything so trivial as a statute or an appellate court stand in the way of
justice. After a series of protracted legal battles with Reserve, Judge Lord
ordered an immediate shutdown of the mine, without allowing Reserve any
time to arrange an alternative system for land-based disposals. A flurry of
13. FARBER, supra note 4, at 19.
14. d at 20.
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appeals followed, and the Eighth Circuit eventually conducted an extensive
review of the available evidence: animal studies, epidemiological studies of
Duluth residents, and studies of asbestos workers.
Farber's able and balanced review of the complex and inconclusive
evidence on all these points seems to confirm the court's conclusion that,
from the available evidence, "it cannot be said that the probability of harm
is more likely than not." "5On that state of the record, the Eighth Circuit
held that it was improper to order an immediate shutdown of the plant.
Accordingly, it allowed Reserve a reasonable period of time to switch to a
land-based system of disposal. The decision represented only a
conventional balancing of hardships in a case in which injunctive relief was
sought, given that a plant shutdown would have resulted in massive
dislocations for shareholders and workers. Nor was this just a trade-off
between money and health. Health issues were, at least indirectly, on both
sides of the matter, because any drastic cut in workers' income could have
indirectly generated health problems of its own. After the Eighth Circuit's
decision, Judge Lord was removed from the case because of his repeated
judicial outbursts against Reserve. The conversion to land-based disposal
took several years and was completed in 1980. Yet the plant closed two
years later, a victim of declining market demand for its products.
To Farber, the case fits neatly into his theory of presumptive state
intervention given the high level of uncertainty about the consequences of
further discharges: Better safe than sorry. Rather than giving us a swift,
clean answer as to how he would have disposed of the case and why, Farber
launches into a prolonged discussion of the limitations of economic analysis
in weighing the competing interests on each side of the question. This
quickly leads into consideration of the limitations of the Pareto concept of
efficiency, 6 a discussion of the value of Lake Superior to nonusers, 7 and a
lengthy examination of "contingent valuation" techniques, by which
ordinary people are asked to state how much they would pay to be rid of
certain environmental hazards.' 8 But once he has completed this large
detour, he reaches some sensible conclusions. He notes that an immediate
closure of the plant would have created massive dislocation for workers and
their families, and he observes correctly that any sharp shift in their income
could have had negative health consequences for members of the affected
community. He further observes that any alternative systems of land-based
disposal would themselves have created some environmental risks for what

15. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 520.
16. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 44-48.
17. See id. at 48.
18. See id. at 49-51. For an exhaustive account of the uses and limitations of the technique,
see John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995).
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appear to be at most uncertain benefits.'9 But in the end, he favors closing
down the plant after some reasonable delay because of the environmental
presumption. The choice boils down to one between two kinds of error. He
asks us which would cause us a larger pang of regret: shutting down the
plant and discovering that the precautions were not necessary, or keeping it
open and discovering that many lives were lost.' To Farber, the uneasiness
with the second form of error clinches the case for using the environmental
presumption.
The question then arises, how ought this case to be dealt with under the
alternative property-rights approach? On this view, the first step is to break
the broad class of environmental harms into three distinct categories. The
first arises when one individual inflicts harm on either the person or
property of a stranger. The second situation includes harm inflicted on the
"environment" writ large, with no particular individual claiming exclusive
property rights to the thing that has been taken or destroyed. This problem
arises whenever a factory emits pollutants into the air or water, resources
that have common ownership. The third involves individual harms arising
out of a consensual arrangement, as when a factory worker agrees to work
in a less-than-ideal work environment.
Generally speaking, these three situations call for different institutional
responses. I put to one side the third class of cases on the ground that it
raises the question of whether private contracts can properly allocate risks
between consenting parties, for which I think the answer is generally yes.2 '
Turning to the first class of cases, environmental harms caused by physical
invasions to private property have long been addressed by the law of

19. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 71.

20. See id at 71-72.
21. The mutually agreeable allocation can reduce the risk in question or place it on the party

who is best able to bear it. This contractual combination of incentive and insurance functions
requires both the firm and the worker to make unavoidable and uncertain trade-offs. It could
involve predetermined damage payments patterned on a workers' compensation system. See
Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation
Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982). Alternatively, it could adopt various risk-reduction mechanisms
such as training, inspections, and safety devices. Firms could pay risk premiums to workers who

are forced to accept (even with compensation ex post) higher risk levels. See W. KIP VISCUSI.
RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 43-44 (1983). In some
cases individual workers or consumers might lack sufficient information to make intelligent
choices, but in general I believe that these difficulties with the contractual mechanism are
overstated and that legislative efforts such as OSHA are often more notable for their
anticompetitive effects than for their economic efficiency. See. e.g., Ann P. Bartcl & Lacy Glenn
Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA 's Impact, 28 J.L &
ECON. 1 (1985). But the issue is one on which opinion is, to say the least, sharply divided. For a

more recent account of the cost-benefit calculations implicit in these workplace issues, see Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE Li. 1981 (1998), which
discusses the implicit cost-benefit issues that dominate once the matter is treated as a subject for
direct government regulation.
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trespass and nuisance. 2 While any physical invasion by way of pollution or
discharge presumptively creates an actionable wrong, two refinements to
this common-law baseline are necessary to develop a coherent legal
approach. First, some nuisances are sufficiently small and widespread that
everyone is better off in the long run if all forms of relief-self-help,
damages, and injunctions-are denied: Backyard noise, barbecues, burning
leaves, and the like are all covered by the live-and-let-live rule.23 Everyone
sacrifices some security of property against external invasion in return for
greater freedom of action with his or her own land. Ideally, if everyone is
better off, and no one is worse off, it is difficult to imagine any policy
argument that drives us toward some contrary rule. The second refinement
renders certain forms of noninvasive behavior actionable on the same
theory of reciprocal benefits and burdens. Thus, individuals are required to
support adjacent land in exchange for a like obligation on their neighbors,
with both sides gaining. 24 This obligation does not require any landowner to
take affirmative steps to support his neighbor's land, but it does impose the
obligation not to remove soil from one's own land to an extent that would
cause subsidence to the neighbor's land. The obligation is perfectly
reciprocal so that on average both sides are better for having it than not, as
the rule avoids the need to negotiate complex support easements with
multiple neighbors in order to keep one's own land intact.
For these purposes, the refinements in boundary disputes take a back
seat to the major discharges that damage the property and well-being of
other people. Ironically, within this domain, Farber weakens the case for
environmental protection by underplaying the standard common-law
approach, which presumptively grants injunctive relief whenever the
plaintiff suffers a substantial invasive harm, wholly without regard to
whether the defendant's use of the property was reasonable under the
circumstances.' Under this rule, once substantial harm is established,
22. For a more detailed account of the law, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS §§ 14.9-.10

(1999).
23. See Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862) (developing the basic rule
by which reciprocal low levels of nuisance are ignored for the mutual benefit of all parties): see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (1977) (giving the American reception).
For a defense, see EPSTEIN, supra note 22, § 14.9.
24. See Corporation of Birmingham v. Allen, 6 Ch. D. 284 (1877) (Eng.). For discussion, see
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its UtilitarianConstraints,8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 49, 96-98 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 650-652 (Wis. 1969). For the
opposite view, see Copart Industries v. ConsolidatedEdison, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977).
endorsed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 23, § 827. Note that the idea of

reasonableness can enter into the nuisance calculus in one of two ways. First, the idea covers only
the case of low-level reciprocal harms that make both sides better off, as in Bamford. Second, it
operates in a fashion more closely akin to negligence law, under the Hand formula, see United
States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), such that the defendant's gains can be
set off against the plaintiff's losses without compensation. In principle, both formulas could
achieve acceptable social results, but the first formula is on balance more likely to reduce the
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relatively little attention is paid to the "balance of equities" between the
parties, and hence to the dislocations brought by injunctive relief.
This common-law approach should have been applied in cases like
Reserve Mining. Consider, for example, the one nuisance case that Farber
does discuss, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,2 6 which weakened the level
of environmental protection by refusing to grant injunctive relief for a
substantial environmental harm. There the question before the court was
whether an injunction or only damages should be awarded to the neighbors
of a cement plant who suffered the indignities of noise, vibration, and filth
in their homes. The traditional common-law approach recognized no
ostensible parity of interest, no neutrality between an aggressor on the one
side and a victim on the other. Only with the modem skepticism about
unidirectional causation, which received its academic canonization in
Ronald Coase's The Problem of Social Cost, does the outcome hang in the
balance. Coase downgraded the importance of the common-law physical
invasion so that it became possible, indeed necessary, to ask who had
caused this harmful interaction: the owners of the cement plant or the
people who lived near it? But under the older common-law approach, the
physical invasion test clearly resolves that question, and the legal advantage
shifts to the neighbors who suffer from the noise and filth.
At this point, the common-law court should stick to its traditional rule
and issue an injunction against the cement factory instead of allowing it to
escape with the payment of permanent damages. To be sure, that rule could
cause dislocation to the local communities whose plants are closed down.
But it is most unwise to evaluate the soundness of automatic injunctive
relief simply by looking at its consequences for community life only after
the construction of the cement plant. If the common-law rule were clearly
established before plant construction, Atlantic Cement would pursue an
appropriate development course. No longer would it simply construct
expensive facilities in the hope that it would be able to tough out the legal
challenges down the road. Now it would seek to resolve the conflicts with
neighbors before a sorry impasse of the sort found in Boomer arose. The
Atlantic Cement Company could have constructed its plant in a more
remote location so as to avoid the conflicts; it could have purchased the
amount of environmental harm. The strict-liability rule imposes clearer obligations, which in turn

reduces the uncertainty associated with lawsuits.
26. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
27. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). The judicial

skepticism preceded Coase. In Miller v.Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). the Supreme Court
professed indifference as to whether the pests that inhabited the defendant's cedar trees and
infected the state's apple trees counted as a common nuisance. By making the matter purely
legislative, the Court blocked any possible claim for compensation by the individual owners of
cedar trees who were forced to cut them down in order to halt the infectious cycle. For a
discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
EMINENTDOMAIN 113-15 (1985).

TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
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nearby lands or servitudes over them, so as to internalize the losses before
the plant went into operation; or it could have had the state condemn the
nearby lands to make way for plant construction-at least if that initiative
could pass muster under the "public use" limitation of the Takings
Clause.2" To this last tactic, one might protest that the construction of a
private cement plant (as opposed to a grist mill obliged to take all
customers)29 does not pass the public-use test. But if this objection to
legislative condemnation is valid, then it cannot be skirted by allowing
judicial action to step in where legislative action would be
unconstitutional.30
At this juncture, the ironies only mount. A tough reading of the publicuse requirement supplies greater, and more grounded, environmental
protection than the new pragmatic approach. A more lenient reading of the
clause still results in substantial damages against the defendant for the
discomfort and anxiety of the injured. How the choice of remedies shakes
out is not entirely clear, but the property-rights analysis strongly points
toward awarding some multiple of provable damages to compensate both
for the loss of amenities that such nuisances entail and for the insult of
invading the plaintiffs space without first procuring his permission. Of
course, the common-law system does not require an automatic injunction in
all cases, but it reaches Farber's preferred end point by a straightforward
application of battle-tested principles.
That Farber gravitates toward this approach is to his credit. But his
rhetoric is too tentative: "In analyzing Boomer, I would favor a baseline of
protection against such invasive activities. Rather than leaving the remedy
to the unrestrained balancing of the court, I would begin with a presumption
in favor of injunctive relief." 3'The mystery is how his pragmatism gets him
there. Earlier on, he endorses Cass Sunstein's well-known skepticism about
the modem application of common law by noting that "Sunstein rightly
says that the common law baseline is often inappropriate in the post-New
Deal world." 32 In this case, however, that skepticism leads to weakening
environmental protection. It is not surprising, therefore, that in his next
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V (" [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."). Note that the "public use" component of the Takings Clause has largely been
read out of the modem law by judicial interpretation. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.

229, 241 (1984) ("But where the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by
the Public Use Clause."). The use of the rational-basis test sounds the death knell for a serious
exploration of the use of this clause.
29. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885).

30. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) ("Nor is it constitutionally
permissible to impose servitude on land, without consent of the owner, by payment of permanent

damages where the continuing impairment of the land is for a private use.").
31. FARBER, supra note 4, at 113 n.36.
32. Id. at 103. For Professor Sunstein's own criticism of the common-law baselines, see CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 210-33 (1990).
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sentence Farber shies away from any fatally alluring "'neutral' normative
baseline, which treats entitlements as initially unassigned, so that neither
party begins with any presumptive claim." 33 Last, he notes that "we can
assign the presumptive entitlement to the beneficiaries of the regulatory
program." 3
Thus our mystery deepens. Farber rightly concludes that the neutral
stance falls flat in cases like Boomer, where the facts suggest only "a false
symmetry ' 35 between parties-because, one presumes, of the obvious
physical invasion, which allows us to call one party innocent and the other
wrongful. A moment's reflection confirms that Farber's third formulation is
useless in common-law disputes in which neither side is the beneficiary of a
statutory program. Worse still, that standard is perverse in any legislative
struggle. Farber would lead the charge against a " Cement Industry
Protection Act" that sought to insulate the cement companies from
vexatious litigation by small landowners who should know better than to
live side by side with large industrial producers. So, by process of
elimination, the only approach that justifies Farber's substantive outlook is
the system of common-law property rights that he peremptorily dismisses,
for only that system rejects the false symmetry raised by the Coasean view
of causation-the system rejects the idea that my nose got in the way of
your fist. If these arguments are misguided, then at least Farber should offer
an account as to why the physical invasion test fails in Boomer or
elsewhere. Instead, he gives us silence.
For ordinary private disputes, then, the property-rights analysis supplies
Farber's pragmatic environmentalism with the principled foundation it
lacks. How does this analysis apply to Reserve Mining? Obviously,
Reserve's discharges were a physical invasion of property not owned by the
mining company. Reserve differs from Booner, however, because Lake
Superior has no private owner. Yet if such a private owner could be found,
as is the case with many private lakes, does anyone doubt, at least before
Boomer, that the owner would be entitled to enjoin these massive deposits,
whether or not they caused some separate and incremental environmental
damage? That case would be no harder than one in which an inconsiderate
neighbor decided to dump huge loads of trash in your backyard because he
could demonstrate that shipping the trash to the landfill would be too
expensive. The waste-generator's willingness to abandon ownership would
not excuse him from having to remove the material, nor would it offer a
reason for denying an injunction against further dumping.

33. FARBER, supra note 4, at 103.
34. Id.
35. 1& at 112.
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Once that point is established, it becomes incumbent upon us to fill the
void created by the absence of private champions for public waters. A
sensible approach might be to treat the state as owner of these waters,
perhaps as their trustee for the public at large. But Farber's rhetorical stance
precludes him from asking how well this characterization succeeds, either
as precedent or analogy. Thus, his book contains no discussions of
common-pool problems, the public trust doctrine, or any kindred subjects.
But these private categories give us a useful insight into-though not a
knockdown solution to-Reserve Mining.
The first task of the state, as owner of public waters, is to defend those
waters against all comers, by bringing ordinary tort actions to enjoin the
spillage of waste materials into private waters. The situation is really no
different from the state's enjoining as a matter of right the diversion of
water from an established riverbed. In either case, the state prevents one
person from unilaterally destroying or appropriating a common-pool asset.
It is no different from a situation in which an owner of a private pond keeps
out waste and gunk for the benefit of his nonexclusive licensees, none of
whom can maintain nuisance actions against outsiders.36
The inquiry becomes more complicated because the state as a trustee
for individual members of the public must also acknowledge the limited use
rights that members of the public enjoy over the common water resource.
Treating the term "public trust" not in a metaphorical, but in a literal
fashion, raises the question: What should the trustee do with public assets
when its diverse beneficiaries clash with each other, as in Reserve Mining?
To evaluate this skein of events, one must go back to the beginning and
ask whether Minnesota acted consistently with its trustee obligations in
1947 by issuing a permit that allowed Reserve Mining to dump its wastes in
public waters free of charge. I believe that the state did not act properly, for
it is a presumptive misuse of public power to give away some
disproportionate use right of public waters that an ordinary private trustee
would part with, if at all, only for a fee.37 The point has some clear
historical precedent in that the common practice is, for example, to hold
competitive bids for oil leases, and not simply award them to a party that
the state deems on some objective criteria to be the most worthy recipient.
The compensation requirement, and not some public cost-benefit analysis,
drives the process, as it should, given the risks of major abuse to the
integrity of public waters.38
36. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the common view by limiting the cast of
characters that constitute proper plaintiffs for a nuisance action. This includes the owner of the
fee, possessory, and nonpossessory estates, but excludes the ordinary licensee. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 23, § 821E cmts. c, f.
37. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, The PublicTrust Doctrine. 7 CATO J. 411 (1987).
38. For a detailed history of the leasing of public lands in Florida, see Watson v. Hollan, 20
So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1945). Note that the general rules called for competitive bids for leases, but
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By this standard, it is not clear that Minnesota could license the
pollution of public waters even if it received compensation. But assuming
that the state would be allowed to trade off environmental losses against
other gains when compensation were received, in the absence of a
competitive market it is not obvious how that fee should be determinedbut it should cover at least the anticipated damage to the lake and its other
users, including, of course, damage to amenities. Even if it is difficult to
assign a precise value to these losses, the fee should not, under any
circumstances, be reduced or waived because of the collateral benefits that
employees, suppliers, and shareholders receive from dumping wastes into
Lake Superior. These groups can, if they so choose, internalize these
environmental costs by taking lower wages for services, charging higher
prices for goods, or accepting lower returns on stock. But the permitting
process observed none of these concerns, so matters got off on the wrong
foot when Reserve Mining received its sweetheart deal in 1947.
This initial gaffe set the stage for the subsequent confrontation in
Reserve Mining. A fee per unit of dumping would have reduced Reserve's
discharge level, both cumulatively and currently, thus dampening fears of
environmental disruption and asbestos contamination. Any sensible
strategy, moreover, would have denied Reserve a perpetual, unconditional
license to dump in public waters, but would have retained the state's right
to alter the fee structure or to reduce or suspend output in the light of any
new information about the anticipated level of harm. Once again, the
classical property-rights approach moves us closer to the right result,
without invoking a special environmental baseline. As ever, it might remain
an open question whether Reserve could be held liable in tort if its dumping
caused health problems that were unknown at the time of dumping but that
manifested themselves thereafter. But no matter which way that question
were resolved, the introduction of any fee structure would be likely to
reduce the level of dumping and thus the severity of any unknown
consequences.
Further difficulties would loom if the discharges into public waters
caused tangible harm to fish or other marine life. To the extent that the
damage took its toll on state-owned property, the ordinary tort law should
supply the appropriate remedy. But the logic of state ownership does not
carry over to fish and wildlife, which, generally speaking, are unowned
until the moment of capture. In this context, why should the state treasury

required that they be structured so that the leases did not interfere with other public uses of the
waters in question, such as bathing, fishing, recreation, and navigation. See id. at 391-93.
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recover the losses sustained by individual fishermen or others, such as
processors, who are dependent on their catch ?
One conceptual difficulty is that private tort actions are normally
brought only by people who have been deprived of established property
rights. The response is that someone has to be able to bring actions for the
loss of unowned, but valuable, fish, for otherwise no polluter will have the
proper incentive to avoid these economic losses. In response to this
problem, in the absence of legislative intervention, the case law has evolved
to allow these actions.4 0 Yet at the same time courts are reluctant to allow
any action by parties located within the second tier-such as processors
deprived of their local source of supply-for three reasons. First, the
proliferation of interested parties creates administrative difficulties in
handling the suit. Second, the damages to entities in the second tier are
much more difficult to assess. While a fishing operator with a local license
can do little to avoid losses if his potential catch is destroyed, processors
typically purchase from multiple markets and are in a much better position
to mitigate their loss. Third, the refusal to allow actions in the second tier
does not create a legal void, since the defendants already have strong
incentives to limit their pollution, given that they are already exposed to
private tort actions and state fines, which are both sensitive to the level of
discharges. On balance, it looks as though convenience favors allowing
actions by immediate parties with large stakes, such as fishermen or owners
of lakes, but denies them to parties one step removed, such as processors
and retail fish stores. Perhaps all this analysis is wrong in the light of the
environmental presumptions that Farber wishes to establish. But it is hard to
tell his views because he never gets down to the level of detail that this
problem requires.
III. BEYOND RESERVE MINING
This analysis of Reserve Mining represents one response to one type of
environmental problem. The lessons learned from this exercise should, in
principle, carry over to other issues. In this Part, I shall briefly consider two
such issues: fisheries and air pollution. The first, like Reserve Mining,
involves water-based resources. The second is also connected to Reserve
Mining in that it involves pollution of a common resource. In both contexts,

39. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22, §§ 21.1-.12; Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for
Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1994) (discussing the
optimal regime for compensating economic losses attributable to pollution in public waters).
40. See In re The Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1997) (accepting claims
for economic losses but disallowing claims by Alaska natives to recover noneconomic claims for
cultural damage); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing
commercial fishermen to recover from oil companies for the negligent diminution of aquatic life).
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the overall lesson is the same: Neither the environmental baseline nor the
pragmatic approach provides sufficient guidance. Only a patient
examination of the details of institutional structures can fill that void. So it
is appropriate here to make a few remarks about the regulation of fisheries
and air pollution, followed by a comparison of the two.
A. The Fishery
In dealing with pollution, the point of departure was the common law of
nuisance as used to protect private lands, air, and water. When turning to
the fishery, the point of departure becomes the common-law rules of
acquisition of property.4 ' By those rules, fish (and all other forms of
wildlife) in the state of nature are regarded as unowned but subject to
ownership through the rule of first possession. With fisheries, this is
embodied in the rule of capture: The first to gain possession of the fish
owns it, and may kill, keep, use, or sell it at his free will and discretion. A
similar rule applies to land, where the first occupant obtains exclusive rights
to the land in perpetuity, with the standard incidents of ownership: the
rights to exclude, possess, use, and dispose of the land in question.
The first-possession rule has the virtue of assigning a single owner to a
valuable asset and allows that asset to enter the stream of commerce in a
quick and efficient fashion. But as with all legal rules, its strengths should
not blind us to its weaknesses. The large prize that is attached to gaining
ownership leads individuals to accelerate their efforts to take possession of
things with value. With land, these costs are usually less critical, because
premature ownership of land does not entail its premature destruction. But
with fish and wildlife, the risks are more acute. When the levels of capture
are low, the first-possession rule tends to work fairly well because small
captures do not threaten the stock.42 But when capture rates are high, private
activity sparks the tragedy of the commons. Each individual fisherman
gains all the benefit from his premature action, but suffers only a small
portion of the overall loss from a reduction in the common stock. Taken
over all individuals, the excessive patterns of capture can destroy the
resource base. None of the individual players desires this outcome, but each
acting alone is powerless to prevent it. This obvious prisoner's dilemma is a
sensible ground for government intervention: State coercion can leave each
player better off than he would be if free to act without limits in the short
run.

41. For a discussion of this topic, see Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13
GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
42. Such is the lesson from Harold Demsetz, Toward a 77eory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
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Rationales for catch limitations have been part of the legal culture since
the nineteenth century. The real payoff, however, comes from the details of
system design. What specific limitations on the right of capture best
preserve the natural resources in the common pool? One recent real-life
system, fishing for halibut, has been exhaustively analyzed by R. Quentin
Grafton, Dale Squires, and Kevin Fox.43 It neatly illustrates how apparent
details determine the success or failure of a system intended to ward off the
tragedy of the commons. Quite simply, even though everyone today
recognizes the need for regulation of the commons, the choice here is not
simply between regulation and nonregulation. Rather it is about the specific
set of regulatory initiatives that best achieves its objective, a subject on
which Farber generally has very little to say.44
Halibut are caught by longline gear. A set of baited hooks is attached to
short lines, which are in turn connected to a main fishing line and a series of
buoys. During the 1980s, the effective public constraint on the number of
fish caught was the number of days that a vessel was allowed to run lines.
As these days were reduced from sixty-five to six, the size of each catch
increased by over fifty percent. Crews increased in size; certain areas were
overfished; lines crossed and tangled; and baited lines continued to catch
fish after they had been severed from boats. The catch was concentrated
within a few days, which compromised prices to processors and resulted in
a lack of fresh halibut for much of the year. By 1988, when the situation
reached crisis proportions, a different mode of allocation was imposed,
whereby individual vessel quotas (defined as a percentage of the total
allowable catch) were determined by vessel length and best catch in the
previous four years. The authors summarize their results as follows:
The "privatization" of the [British Columbia] halibut fishery is a
natural experiment of the effects of changes in property rights in a
common-pool resource. The introduction of private harvesting
rights in 1991 led to an important transformation in the industry
and the behavior of fishers. In particular, the creation of an
exclusive harvesting right allowed for an increase in the fishing
season from just six days in 1990 to over six months in 1991, and
over eight months since 1992. A longer fishing season has allowed
fishers to increase the quality of the fish landed and enabled them
to sell almost all of their harvest as a higher priced fresh product.
As a result, unit quota rents and producer surplus per pound
43. See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of a
Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & EcON. (forthcoming Oct. 2000) (manuscript at 27, on ile with
The Yale Law Journal).
44. This is a point for which he has been harshly, perhaps too harshly, criticized in David
Roe, Green Scholarship, 3 GREENBAG 2D 97 (1999), which notes that Eco-Pragmatism "avoids
grappling with experience, case law, and scholarship over the last twenty years that could have
supported its argument and given content to its intellectual goal." Id. at 98.
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significantly increased between 1988 and 1991, and again between
1991 and 1994. Surveys of fishers also indicate that private
harvesting rights made fishing safer, reduced losses of fishing gear,
and decreased wastage of fish. Further, a shift in the property-right
regime led to greater cooperation or co-management between the
fishers and the regulator. Such improvements would not have been
possible under the previous property-rights structure where fishers
tried to catch as many fish as possible in a very limited period of
time.4'
That said, the difference between the unadorned property approach and
Farber's more nuanced pragmatism is striking. Grafton, Squires, and Fox
do not rely on any special environmental baseline in their analysis. Nor do
they dwell on how the tragedy of the commons propels the need to regulate
the catch in the first place. The differences they report result from different
systems of environmental control, and not simply from the differences
between the common-law rule of capture and just any old system of
common-pool regulation.' The more detailed the information, the better the
choice, and the less the environmental baseline matters. I am hard-pressed
to see what Farber's pragmatic environmentalism adds to the overall
analysis.
B. Air Pollution
The same critique of Farber's position applies to air pollution, where
once again the details of the system are critical. In dealing with the 1990
Clean Air Act, Farber offers cautious remarks about the importance of
marketable sulfur-dioxide allowances.4" But his remarks are bloodless at
best. In this context, let me relate Jonathan Adler's informative account of
the fierce legislative wrangling surrounding the passage of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments (CAAA).4 This tale has no happy ending, given the
massive political pressures that systematically forced the statute down selfdestructive environmental paths.49 The major changes mandated under the
CAAA are costly to implement and often produce no effective reduction in
the level of noxious pollutants. Part of the difficulty stems from the success
45. Grafton et al., supra note 43 (manuscript at 27).

46. The common-law rule of capture awards the animal, regarded as unowned in the state of
nature, to the first taker of it The rule goes back to Roman times, see G. INST. 2.66. and has been
adopted in the common law as well. The best-known case on the subject is Pierson v. Post. 3 Cai.
R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
47. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 180-81. For more discussion of air pollution generally, see
ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POuCY 755-

865 (2d ed. 1996).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
49. See Adler, supra note 8, at 26.
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of earlier state initiatives, which introduced the easy fixes that have a high
ratio of marginal benefit to marginal cost. Additional improvements do not
come cheap, because the 1970 Clean Air Act initiatives have already
eliminated around ninety-six percent of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide
in tailpipe emissions." Further technical complications arise because efforts
to curb one form of pollutant may raise the levels of a second. Adding
ethanol to gasoline, for example, could cut carbon dioxide emissions by up
to twenty-two percent nationwide, but only at the cost of a fifty-percent
increase in total volatile organic compounds. 1 The relevant tradeoffs are
between different environmental risks, a task for which Farber's
presumptive environmental baseline provides no guidance. Nor, it appears,
did public deliberation, which Farber praises, do much to improve
matters. Adler describes the consequences:
The RVP exemption [a standard measure of fuel volatility]
illustrates that legislators were prepared to go to extraordinary
lengths in creating a market for ethanol, regardless of the
environmental results. However, it is not the only such illustration.
The oxygen standards, the credit-trading program, the definition of
"no NOx increase" in the EPA's simple model-all were driven
exclusively by political considerations. The result was a regulatory
regime of mind-boggling complexity, a web of standards,
mandates, requirements, and timetables that is incomprehensible to
all but a handful of bureaucrats and to the representatives of the
interests that are being regulated or served. Attached to this
comprehensive management plan, for the sole benefit of certain
industry interests, is an oxygen credit-trading program, which is
proudly presented as evidence of regulatory flexibility and
incentive-based regulation. 3
The failures of air pollution regulation are not confined to the domestic
arena. The proposed Kyoto accords dealing with the question of
international air-pollution control have generated a storm of controversy,
yet Farber has nothing to say about these issues in light of his program.
Three questions are at issue. The first is how much pollution should be
generated in toto. It necessarily raises the technical and economic issues
that Farber likes: those shrouded in uncertainty. But for these purposes, one
can assume that some measure, any measure, of net pollution can be found.
The second issue is who gets what right to generate that pollution. Taking
the simplest assumption that all pollution is equally dangerous regardless of

50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 22.
See id. at 22-23.
See FARBER, supra note 4, at 54-58.
Adler, supra note 8, at 39.
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its source, the answer seems clear: Allocate the pollution rights to those
parties who can generate the largest net social product for any given level
of pollution. In principle, an auction should determine those participants.
These preliminaries lead to the third question: Who gets the proceeds
from the sale? Here there is no "natural" answer because no one knows the
initial distribution of air rights in the first place. So the lack of any baseline
means that the proceeds should be divided among the nations in accordance
with some political solution. But which? Population and industrial yield
generate, to say the least, very different answers. Matters are worse because
this pure question of distribution drives a strong wedge between developed
and undeveloped nations. The efficient producers are located in wealthy
nations, but the strongest claimants on need are the more backward nations
with the least-efficient producers and the lowest standards of living.
Some of this problem could be alleviated by making pollution-emission
rights tradable across nations. But once again, politics makes sales from
undeveloped to developed nations unpalatable, given the reluctance of
poorer nations to be relegated to a passive role in the international political
arena. Yet another proposal is for undeveloped nations to invite large
multinational companies to help them efficiently use their own
development rights, which in too many cases runs smack into a wall of
local chauvinism and protectionism. Matters are made still more
complicated because there is no way (short of war) for one nation to enjoin
the excessive air pollution caused by a second: Each nation's threat position
is high levels of unilateral emissions, which dares other nations to follow
suit. The upshot is that the technical solution is at hand, but the political one
is not. Hence the United States representatives at Kyoto gave their
provisional agreement to a system of pollution control that acknowledges a
system of common but differentiated responsibility, yet locks us into a
situation in which the most efficient producers are required to make the
most substantial cutbacks in production. In consequence, the United States
takes on a disproportionate burden of the anticipated reductions, even
though it is one of the most efficient producers of industrial goods. The
injection of distributional concerns and weak political oversight sets us on a
course for failure.
C. The Two Compared
One critical public-choice question is why the new regime for catching
halibut counts as a success while the various initiatives for air pollution
control count as failures on both the domestic and foreign scene. The source
of this difference does not lie in any grand theory of deliberative
democracy, but in a close public-choice analysis. In the halibut fishery, the
proposed changes were first suggested by the fishermen themselves. They
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were able to realize this solution because all interested parties had roughly
parallel positions on an issue that aligned itself in a single dimension: They
wanted to maximize a single good-the net gain over time from the catch
of the fish. That simple problem cleared the way to an easy conceptual
solution because the position of all fishermen rose or fell together. The
strong knowledge base, the focused objective, and the common incentive
structure worked together to yield a favorable outcome.
The situation with air pollution was far more complex. The overall goal
of pollution control was still present, but the political dynamics were
drastically different. On the domestic front, many of the initiatives came
from the Environmental Protection Agency, ruled by its own imperative for
bureaucratic expansion regardless of the consequences.' 4 Moreover, the
interests of private parties were in conflict with each other. A solution that
helped ethanol producers would hurt gasoline refiners who have worked out
uneasy accommodations with environmental groups-for some sense of the
problem, it is only necessary to read the ExxonMobil advertisements that
appear from time to time on the op-ed page of the New York Times. Any
overall solution that minimizes the net anticipated social harm from
pollution of all kinds would inevitably have profound distributional
consequences. One group would win and a second would lose in a world in
which no side payments were available to even out the burdens in question.
Exactly the same problems plagued the effort to reach sensible
accommodations on questions of global air pollution at Kyoto. Given the
initial positions of the negotiating parties, political process gave birth to a
legal monster, as political deliberation only made it clear to the various
participants just how far apart they really were.

IV. THE DISCOUNTING PROBLEM
This discussion of common-pool problems shows how easy it is to
move from small disputes between neighbors to large disputes that can
envelop the globe. That same form of messianic environmentalism arises
anew when considered over the long haul. This matter is quite inescapable,
for implicit in environmental common-pool problems is the temporal
dimension. Discharges do not cause harm only at the moment of their
release; they may accumulate over time. Excessive capture of fish reduces
the stock and makes sustainable yields impossible. Increases in atmospheric
carbon dioxide have long-term implications for the temperature of the earth
and the survival of human beings, and indeed for all living things, even

54. See William Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617. 618 (1975)

("My model of bureaucratic supply determines only the bureau's preferred output based on an
assumption that the bureau acts to maximize its budget.").

2000]

Too Pragmatic by Half

1661

though these could take generations to manifest themselves. To handle
these issues, we must develop some way to link the present and future on
both the benefit and cost side. The traditional method is the discount rate,
which converts a dollar tomorrow into a dollar today, or the reverse. The
steeper the discount rate, the greater the implicit preference for present
costs and benefits. In dealing with most decisions, a real discount rate (one
that ignores inflation) is normally around two percent per year 5 But even
that modest discount rate attaches only tiny weight to the welfare of the
people alive in 100 years, virtually none of whom are alive today.
Farber offers us a thoughtful, if agonized, discussion over the choice of
the proper discount rate, and even flirts with the absurd idea of using a zero
discount rate to keep future generations, even a billion years from now, on
the social radar screen as vividly as the present inhabitants of the earth.5
This debate is overblown, for the choice of a social discount rate matters
less than is commonly supposed. First, we must have a very inflated view
of our own importance to think that any decision made today will have
much impact on the welfare of individuals a thousand, or even a hundred,
years from now. The present generation does not make all the relevant
decisions while future generations remain locked in autopilot. Their leaders,
their legislatures, and their environmental activists will happily overrule our
decisions just as we have overruled the decisions, thoughtless or not, of
prior generations. In the interim, the soot that we place in the atmosphere
will slowly settle to the ground. After all, what are the effects of the
pollution generated by the bombings and wreckage of World War II on the
welfare of the present? The future counts less for us because it rightly
counts more for unborn generations who have to be depended on to take the
right steps once their time arises. And there is always a risk of taking costly
steps today that could prove unnecessary in light of the technological
improvements tomorrow.
But what about those decisions that lead to the immediate destruction of
the Earth? Of course, we should fear such foolishness. But in such cases the
discount rate matters not a whit because the present generation has
sufficient incentive to preserve itself, at least if it can overcome its own
humdrum collective-action problems. Unborn generations can thus happily
free-ride off the present against those cataclysms. The only way to falsify
this conclusion is to imagine situations in which the future is worse than it
ought to be because we have mortgaged it to make the present better. But

55. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 142, 156 (citing Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi.
Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New Evidence and Policy Implications, 18 J. ENVrL
ECON. & MGMT. S-5 1, S-59 to S-62 (1990)). For a critique of Moore and Viscusi. see Richard L
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives.

99 COLuM. L. REV. 941,974-81 (1999).
56. See FARBER, supra note 4, at 143.
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that unlikely scenario presupposes that we can enjoy life today and
postpone all adverse consequences with laser-like precision until the next
generation. Farber is drawn to just this form of artificial reasoning when he
contrasts two hypothetical projects for waste disposal." The first waste
dump produces no deaths in construction, but is certain to cause a billion
deaths in the year 2500. 58 The second may cause one or two deaths today,
but none in the future.59 How do we choose? Answer: Not at all, because
the choice is artificially contrived to speak only of false options. Should we
really think that a project that holds a risk, or even certainty, of catastrophic
failure in 500 years poses no short-term risk? Should we think that we have
only two corner solutions when we might tweak questions of design, siting,
and supervision in a thousand different ways? Should we further assume
that the next generation will be unable to fix any such monstrous danger
after it becomes apparent: Can anyone conceive of a technology (for which
there are no substitutes) that could be fixed at the cost of one death today
but one million tomorrow? Why assume that we can, or must, make only
binary decisions between today's benefits and the next millennia's payback,
with nothing in between? Any real choice set involves initial decisions that
are constantly modified in the light of future circumstances, taking into
account shifts in popular demand, changes in technology, and external
shocks to the system from natural causes. Both costs and benefits occur in
all relevant time periods for all relevant environmental choices. We have no
monopoly on the future.
For this simple truism, we and our descendants should all pay homage
to the free-riders of the future. The basic logic is the same whether we deal
with pollution or with exhaustion of common-pool resources. Either way,
the first desideratum is for decisions that make sense within short time
periods. An easy rule of thumb in the fishery case is to make sure that the
annual catch does not deplete the stock for the next year. If the
commonplace principle of sustainable yields is consistently followed, the
future, when left to its own devices, will neatly take care of itself, one year
at a time. The short-term adjustments in allowable catch limits will yield
long-term benefits, for it is difficult to imagine a pattern in which shortterm austerity yields long-term destruction of natural resources. A similar
solution applies to air pollution controls. If we can keep emissions levels,
properly calculated, constant over time, then the long-term problem will
take care of itself, one year at a time-which won't happen under the Kyoto
plan given its political preferences for underdeveloped nations. Of course,
any sensible solution requires the next generation to play its part. But no

57. Seeid. at 150-51.

58. See id. at 150.
59. See id.
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matter what we do, our conceptual exercise is rendered moot if 100 years
from now our great-grandchildren want the world to go up in flames.
Indeed, in a very real sense, the long-term position is rosier still. Thus
far, the implicit assumption is that the level of output for any given measure
of input is constant. But in general, we should join with Julian Simon and
expect that improved technology will increase all relevant measures of
output.6' Aquaculture may reduce the need to raise fish in a common-pool
environment. Simon won his famous bet with Paul Ehrlich because
technology rendered mineral resources less valuable, as glass fiber had
replaced copper fiber." The key to environmental success is keeping overall
technology humming so that information travels on the Internet and not
through the U.S. Postal Service, with its expenditures of paper, fuel, labor,
and other raw materials so that ill-maintained government trucks can
pollute the air. Indeed, if we get things right for those in the next
generation, preserving the environment should be an easier task for them.
The future comes in bite-size pieces. Simon correctly saw that human
intelligence could reduce the demand for key natural resources far more
rapidly than human growth would demand them. The key to environmental
preservation does not lie chiefly in narrowly conceived policies of resource
preservation that ignore all dynamic social forces. Environmental
preservation cannot be achieved by a rule that refuses to discount
environmental costs, but applies that discount figure to just about
everything else: For in that case we should spend only on those projects that
are labeled "environmental," and create by indirection an environmental
problem of far greater magnitude. Rather, the key to a successful policy lies
in a willingness to abandon the view that the planet can survive only if
population shrinks to a tiny fraction of the present level-our gift, as it
were, to future generations. So on the state of the world in a billion years, it
60. See SIMON, supra note 2, at 31-32 (noting that academics are the most hidebound
adherents to their own diminishing expertise). For some striking confirmation of the Simon thesis,
see PACIFIc RESEARCH INST., 1999 INDEX OF LEADING ENVtRONmENTAL INDIcATORs (Steven
Hayward et al. eds., 1999), which noted (by way of example only) sharp declines in various
environmental indicators. See id. at 19 (ambient carbon monoxide), 20 (ambient lead levels). 21
(blood levels of lead in children), 22 (ambient ozone). The key question is the extent to which
these reductions should be attributed to improved technology, wise policy, or some combination
of these. And the possibility that bad policies could deter welcome technical innovation should
never be overlooked either.
61. The bet concerned the prices of a marketbasket of commodities in 1990: copper, lead,
tungsten, etc. Simon allowed Ehrlich to pick the commodities in the basket, and then claimed that
their price in real dollars would be lower in 1990 than they were in 1980. His view was that
technological advances would negate potential scarcities. Ehrlich took the opposite position.
Simon clearly won as commodity prices dropped across the board, and Ehrlich declined to renew
the bet. Note that all relevant events took place within a decade. For an account of the bet, see
John Tiemey, Betting the P/anet, N.Y. TImES, Dec. 2, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. For
commentary on this account, see PERCIvAL Er AL, supra note 47. at 1392, which notes that
although Simon won the bet, Ehrlich remains "highly popular," while Simon "has few
followers."
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is best to relax: The sunspots will take care of that issue. After much selfinflicted doubt, Farber ends up in the right place and for the right reason.
"Like runners in a relay race, we may do best when we concentrate on
passing the baton to the next runner, leaving the rest of the race to the
succeeding runners." 6' He could have gotten there a lot faster by being less
pragmatic and less ecumenical.
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Thus far, I have examined environmental regulation in connection with
common-pool resources. But I must make brief mention of the evident and
persistent conflict between the environmentalist movement and the
property-rights movement, with which I have long been identified. Farber
pays little attention to this issue, one he regards as a second-order question,
which, in some sense, it surely is since the compensation paid is a means to
some social end rather than the end in itself. But is that compensation
needed? At its most general level, the debate over compensation parallels
the debate between reasonableness and strict-liability rules in nuisance
cases. If either system is correctly applied, we get to the first-best outcome,
as measured by the proper allocation of resources. Quite simply, the
government decides which resources should be held in common and which
should be privatized, and does so without fear or favor, acting on the
strength of the best available information. Given a peerless, if presumed,
record of behavior, the payment of compensation, vel non, is no longer
needed to create the right set of incentives. The only questions that remain
are distributional, based on some perceived sense of equity.
The real world, however, never gives us the luxury to consider
distributional questions wholly apart from their allocative consequences.
Bias is commonplace, given human self-interest. Information is a scarce
commodity, costly to acquire and interpret. The decision as to whether to
provide compensation thus generates powerful behavioral consequences for
public and private actors alike. So the key question here is which rule
(compensation or not) has institutional features that lead to desired social
outcomes, defined at a minimum to cover the adoption of positive-sum
social projects. If collective judgments could determ'ne the most beneficial
use of resources, the need for property rights would vanish.63 Benevolent
and knowledgeable political leaders would make all the correct allocation
decisions. Even if these leaders provided no compensation to individuals,
matters would even out in the long run as everyone shared in the fruits of

62. FARBER, supra note 4, at 160.
63. I develop this theme in Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 41 (1992).
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their high-minded labors. But not all government officials are benevolent,
and their knowledge may be imperfect even if their motives are exemplary.
Private actors do better when they are subject to sensible economic
incentives, and allowing government officials to take or to regulate at will
gives these officials an open invitation to ignore the costs that their actions
inflict on the private parties whose property, quite literally, lies in their
path. A system that couples the government's power to regulate with
responsibility for the property it takes is in general likely to do better. But it
hardly follows that all forms of government regulation can be implemented
only if compensation is paid.
The sensible position recognizes two degrees of regulatory freedom.
First, the government can stop pollution and other nuisances without
compensation when a diffuse group of private property owners finds it
difficult to coordinate legal action for their own protection. That set of
public remedies simply reinforces the strong set of common-law private
rights on environmental issues. Any sensible definition of the police power
seeks to tie it to the control of common-law nuisances. Next, for the
destruction of common-pool resources, some limitations are justified for the
reasons given in the discussion of the Canadian halibut fisheries: The
restrictions work to the long-run advantage of the parties so regulated.' 4 In
some cases, this test might even justify the total prohibition on the killing of
certain endangered species where the sustainable yield may be zero.
But what about habitat preservation-that is, situations in which
restrictions on land use are imposed, without compensation, to protect the
habitat of some plant or animal species?' On yet another controversial
topic that Farber passes over, the common-law rules were clear:. The habitat
was part of the land. Its use, preservation, or destruction was determined
solely by its owner. If the state wanted to preserve the habitat, it could
either buy the land outright or purchase the appropriate easement. Where
government officials chose not to intervene, private environmental groups
could enter with their own offers to purchase the land or the habitat on it.
To the extent that the benefits of species preservation redound to society
generally, it offers the perfect case for having the public at large, not the
individual landowner, bear the cost.' Here Farber should be faulted for not

64. See supra Section II.A.
65. For a recent decision upholding habitat regulations without compensation. see Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapterof Communitiesfor a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). which I criticized
in Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon The Law and Economics of
HabitatPreservation,5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 48-57 (1997). For a somewhat less critical view
of the Endangered Species Act, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The EndangeredSpecies Act: A
CaseStudy in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997).
66. Cf Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was

designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
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taking into account any of the recent efforts of "free market
environmentalists" to use a system of strong property rights to secure
environmental protection.67 To understand Farber's outlook fully, we need
his assessment of this key question.
VI. CONCLUSION
On balance, then, Eco-Pragmatism deserves a mixed review. On the
positive side, the book does not fall prey to any of the excesses of
environmental zealotry. Farber never takes liberties with the evidence and
is careful to distance himself from extremists of all stripes. So far so good.
But the negatives must be reckoned with as well. Throughout the length and
breadth of legal theory, a battle is now being fought over the proper mode
of analysis. Farber falls into a camp that prizes a kind of sober
ecumenicalism that looks with suspicion on the capacity of legal theory and
empirical research to make hard choices on the way to attack knotty
substantive problems. Instead of examining a wide range of substantive
environmental issues head-on, and recounting the experience in the field
over the past generation, he spends too much time on one case, only to
resort thereafter to a variety of avoidance doctrines, the only effect of which
is to distance him from his own subject matter. Like a good republican, he
gives great praise to political deliberation within a democratic structure. Yet
in so doing, he often praises the process of deliberation from afar without
engaging in the tough substantive analysis that makes deliberation
worthwhile. Like a good public-choice scholar, he is aware of the potential
pitfalls in the legislative process; however, he proposes no structural
constraints on the process that respond to these public-choice concerns.
Instead, at every critical juncture he is content to rely on grand global
presumptions, chiefly about the importance of an environmental baseline,
that are meant to incline thoughtful citizens in favor of a respectable level
of regulation.
Unfortunately, his consistent appeal to responsible consensus leads him
to ignore the need to deal with any of the major intellectual alternatives to
his own position. He does not systematically assess, for example, the

fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."). For my more detailed views on
this case, see EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 42-44.
67. Ignoring any one author is, of course, appropriate. But when all relevant authors are left
out of the account, the systematic weakness becomes more apparent. Here is a brief sampling:
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991);
ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE (1995); MICHAEL S. GREVE,
THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN AMERICAN LAW (1996); GARY D. LIBECAP,
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS
(1990); and BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
(1997).
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strengths and weaknesses of traditional property-rights regimes, nor the
standard mechanisms that are designed to control overconsumption of
common-pool assets. His great faith in political deliberation also leads him
to overlook the critical question of the incentive structures that improve the
level of legislative deliberation, such as holding legislatures accountable for
their own conduct. Such structures would require legislatures to think
seriously about which government initiatives require compensation and
which are protected under the police power. I wish I could see him blast
just one ostensibly environmental initiative as self-destructive, misguided,
or simply inept. If he had, I would have read him more sympathetically,
even if he had offered a stirring defense of a dozen others. But that close
examination of particular programs is not part of his lofty purpose. By
staying at so high a level of generality, Eco-Pragmatism will persuade only
those who are predisposed to accept its conclusions in the first place. It will
not advance the science of environmental protection, nor will it lead to the
effective integration of environmental law into the larger system of legal
relations.

